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ABSTRACT 
The Uyghurs are a Muslim population in the Xinjiang province in Northwest 
China.  They have been agitating for independence almost since the formation of the 
PRC.  Like many minorities in Central Asia, the Uyghurs have a long history that 
includes much violence.  Significantly, the Uyghur have not embraced Islamic 
fundamentalism in any meaningful way.  Though there are limited examples of 
fundamentalism in Xinjiang, the population as a whole does not support it, even though 
their goals of independence are the same.   
The reason the Uyghurs have not embraced fundamentalism is because their sense 
of nationalism is stronger, relatively speaking, than their Islamic identity.  The Uyghurs’ 
nationalism, as well as their unique Islamic identity, was forged by a millennium of 
struggle, self-determination, oppressive rule, and external influence — among many 
other factors.  These forces have culminated in a modern Uyghur identity, one that values 
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I. UYGHURS AND WHY  
A. PURPOSE 
 This thesis examines the identity of the Uyghurss in the Chinese region of 
Xinjiang.  In Xinjiang today there are only small pockets of radical Islam, and they are 
focused, almost singularly, on creating a separate state for the Uyghurss, independent of 
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).  The small number of radical elements that do exist 
are not supported by the Uyghurss in general, and little evidence exists that radical Islam 
is on the rise in Xinjiang.   
 The Uyghurs have not radicalized in order to achieve their political objectives, 
and it is important to consider why that is.  Uyghurs culture, including their history, 
religion, and relations with the Chinese, are explored to better understand how the 
Uyghurs see themselves.  This will be the basis for understanding the strength, relatively 
speaking, of Uyghur nationalism compared to their Islamic identity.  Comparing these 
will illuminate how they identify themselves, and ultimately why they have not 
radicalized and do not generally support the radical elements within their borders, even 
though their political goals are the same.  
B. INTRODUCTION 
There are 55 ethnic minority groups in China today with a total population of 
about 91 million people, which makes up about 9 percent of the population of the PRC.1  
This thesis focuses on the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, which is one of the largest Muslim 
minority groups in China.  The Uyghurs, like many minority populations in this part of 
the world, have a history of violence that dates back to well before Xinjiang was part of 
China.  Significantly, in their struggle against the Chinese government over the issue of 
autonomy, they have not radicalized.  The reasons for this struggle are complex and are 
dealt with in turn.   
                                                 
1. Dru Gladney, Dislocating China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 9.  
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C. A HISTORY  OF  VIOLENCE 
It is not correct to identify suicide bombing or other forms of radicalism solely 
with Islamic fundamentalism.  A careful review of these radical attacks in modern times 
reveals that not to be the case.  In the past three decades, the group responsible for the 
most attacks in a single campaign, with the exception of the current situation in Iraq, is 
the Tamil Tigers, a secular Marxist-Leninist group.2  Also included among secular 
suicide bombers are the PKK of Turkey.  Nevertheless, suicide bombing and other forms 
of radicalism are commonly associated with Islamic fundamentalists, so it is worth 
investigating why the Uyghurs do not engage in or support this type of activity in any 
meaningful way. 
There have been Muslims in China since the seventh century.  They came in via 
the Silk Road but it wasn’t until the Turkish influence spread into Xinjiang centuries later 
that Islam really took root.  As a result of their unique experience, the character of these 
people is distinct from all other Muslims in the world.  Radical Islam has not developed 
in China.  To be sure, Chinese-Muslims have a violent past and, in fact, the violence 
continues today as their desire for autonomy clashes with the economic interests of the 
Communist leadership in Beijing.3   
It is important to understand that even though small pockets of Islamic 
fundamentalism exist in Xinjiang, the tightly controlled state-run media make it difficult 
to obtain statistics.  As a result, the data regarding this issue are suspect in many cases.   
According to Zhao Dagong,  
Suicide bombings in China are not due to issues of nationality, religion, or 
conflicts with other nations. They are not acts of organized terrorists, but 




                                                 
2. Robert Pape, Dying to Win (New York: Rand House Inc., 2005), 266. 
3. See James Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A critical assessment,” in East-West Center 
Washington, Policy Studies 6 (2004) for a history of the Uyghur National Movement. Also see June Teufel 
Dreyer, “China’s Islamic Challenge,” in China Brief 1, no. 6 (2001) for a discussion on how Uyghur 
Autonomy has affected Chinese foreign policy and Ahmad Lufti, “China’s Islamic Awakening,” in  China 
Brief 4 no. 10 (2004) for a history of Chinese domestic Uyghur policies.  
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their rights have been denied…The violation of the law by those in power, 
inequalities in society, denial of civil rights—these are the main reasons 
which lead to suicide bombings.4 
 One theory is that suicide bombing has nothing to do with religion.  Instead it is a 
terrorist technique for compelling democratic states to leave an occupied land.  This is a 
Real politik approach to pursuing interests.  Robert Pape contends that it is a recruiting 
tool used to support broader strategic objectives.5  Further, since terrorists recognize that 
they cannot achieve their goals vis-à-vis a more powerful opponent, they have turned to 
this unconventional approach to achieving policy objectives.   
 Pape’s work is compelling, but he fails to acknowledge that the overwhelming 
majority of attacks are conducted by Islamic extremists and therefore special attention 
should be paid to the reasons behind them.  Further, one could easily consider PLA 
troops and government influence in Xinjiang to be an occupying force.  The PRC is 
officially communist, and Pape does not explain what characteristics his “democratic” 
government is required to have. 
Another theory is that radicalization must be viewed in the context of a broader 
social movement.  Mohammed Hafez contends that Muslims rebel due to a combination 
of political and institutional exclusion combined with blanket repression.   
When states do not provide their Islamist opposition movements 
opportunities for institutional participation, and employ repression 
indiscriminately against these movements after a period of prior 
mobilization, Islamists will most probably rebel.6   
 According to Lin Song and He Yan, since the Hui are not natives, that has always 
lived in China, nor are they purely immigrants, Islam has been a very powerful unifying 
force for these people in a way that is different than for other Muslims.  As a result, the 
approach to Islam in China is more dogmatic and there has been relatively little 
interpretation of Islamic text.  Therefore, the textual justification for radicalism has not 
                                                 
4 Zhao Dagong, “Suicide Bombing: An Alarm for the CCP,” Epoch Times International (2006), 
https://us.dongtaiwang.com/dmirror/http/en.epochtimes.com/news/6-4-17/40322.html. 
5 Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 4. 
6 Ibid., 200. 
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been vetted out.7  The Uyghurs are not referred to directly here but it is still a valuable 
concept to consider because though the Uyghurs and the Hui do not share a common 
history, they share many of the same political concerns today.  
Lipman provides a multiple causation argument that has led Chinese-Muslims 
toward violence against each other.  He contends that a long history of struggle and 
violence in Xinjiang has conditioned the Hui toward violence directed largely at each 
other and in a lesser way toward the Chinese government over issues of autonomy.8  
Though Lipman does not specifically address suicide bombing and his study was 
conducted with the Hui, his point about interfactional rivalry is well taken.  It must be 
considered that over time, a certain understanding of the rules of violence have developed 
between factions, and within this context, radicalization did not occur.   
In contrast, Gladney argues that the absence of a unifying political and religious 
leader in Xinjiang that can sort out disputes and move the masses, like the Dalai Lama 
was in Tibet, make Chinese Muslims more prone to local violence and less organization.  
This factionalism has prevented a true unification of the Muslim community.9   
Hodong Kim draws lessons from the 1864 Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang, to 
understand how the Muslim community is organized and what mechanisms made 
rebellion possible.  He found that in 1864 the rebellion was neither well planned nor was 
it a product of close communication or cooperation.10  People of every social rank were 
united under the flag of Islam, and once revolution began in one part of the region, it 
quickly spread through the rest.  In the wake of revolution, a central government was set 
up in Xinjiang, and diplomatic relations were established with Russia and Britian.  
Ultimately, the revolution was put down by the Qing army, and the region was 
reincorporated into the Qing empire once again.  The lesson however, is that the way that 
the community is organized could be a sort of natural barrier to radicalization.  
                                                 
7. Lin Song and He Yan, History of the Hui People and Islamic Culture (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo, 
1992), 1. 
8. Jonathon Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1997), 217. 
9. Gladney, 363.  
10. Hodong Kim, Holy War in China (Standford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 179.  
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More recently, Bovingdon associated Uyghur unrest with government support of 
the Xinjiang Uyghurs Autonomous Region (XUAR).  China has five autonomous 
regions, of which Xinjiang is one.  An autonomous region is a compromise between a 
state that wants a homogenous population and people or a population that wants 
independence.11  Friction, often violent, has developed between the Uyghurs and the Han 
dominated provincial government in Xinjiang.12  The violence stems from the Uyghurs 
response to what they perceive as oppressive government policy.13  This response has 
covered the range between protests and demonstrations to violence including 
assassination. 14   
D. IDENTITY FORMULATION 
The above studies provide excellent insight into the mechanics of fundamentalism 
and insight into the world of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  Unfortunately the question of why 
the Uyghurs have not radicalized in order to achieve their political objectives is still 
unanswered.  The answer is perhaps more fundamental than has been addressed thus far.  
The answer lies in understanding the balance between nationalism and Islamic identity.  
Identity is a melting pot of ideas, history, experience, desires, needs, and wants.  
How a person identifies himself will change based on the context in which he is asked to 
do so.  Uyghur nationalism, or the desire by the Uyghurs to have their own state 
independent of China, exists alongside Islamic identity.  The balance between the two is 
one way to answer the question of Uyghur non-radicalization.  In other words, is it 
possible that national identity as it has been formulated over eleven centuries in Xinjiang 
                                                 
11. Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur 
Discontent,” in East-West Center Washington Policy Studies 11 (2004), vii. 
12. See Arienne Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language, Policy, and Political 
Discourse,” in  East-West Center Washington Policy Studies 15 (2005) for a discussion on how the Uyghur 
are now trying to use a single language and culture to present a more united front to the provincial 
government. 
13. See Yitzhak Shichor, “Blow Up: Internal and External challenges of Uyghur separatism and 
Islamic radicalism to Chinese rule in Xinjiang,” in Asian Affairs vol. 32, no. 2 (2005), for a discussion on 
Chinese economic policy in Xinjiang.  
14. Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur 
Discontent,” in East-West Center Washington Policy Studies 11 (2004) 47.  
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is more prominent, relatively speaking, than Uyghur Islamic identity, and for that reason, 
the Uyghurs have not embraced fundamentalism?   
This thesis presents the interaction between the Uyghurs and the Chinese 
government in terms of government policy as the primary mechanism for understanding 
the formation of Uyghurs nationalism and their Islamic identity.  There are perhaps many 
different ways to understand this relationship, but this approach is used here because 
tangible evidence is available as to the causal impact of Chinese policy.  The fundamental 
tenets of this relationship have not changed since Xinjiang was first identified with 
China.   
The Uyghurs have little more in common with the CCP today than their ancestors 
did with the Manchu Qing dynasty when Xinjiang first became part of “China.”  Their 
dress, customs, language, history, and religion were all unfamiliar to the Chinese.  
Xinjiang has always been recognized for its strategic value.  The Qing saw the region as 
buffer zone between China and the interests of its neighbors along Xinjiangs borders.  
Today, the same is still true, but Xinjiang has even greater value in terms of natural 
resources to fuel the growing Chinese economy.  As a result, Xinjiang has been viewed 
as a backward outer territory since it became part of China.  The Chinese have always 
recognized the strategic value of Xinjiang but have never treated the Uyghurs, or any of 
the other minorities in Xinjiang, as equals.  
Foreign policy has always been linked with domestic policy in China and 
nowhere is this more true than in Xinjiang.  For centuries China-based regimes have 
walked a fine line between integrating Xinjiang into China for national security and 
economic purposes by providing the Uyghurs with a measure of autonomy and 
suppressing any movement toward Uyghur independence with policy and force.  This 
give and take, the back and forth between the Uyghurs and their Chinese contemporaries 
over the centuries has forged the modern Uyghur identity.  This thesis examines the 
forging process in order to understand how the Uyghurs see themselves.  Specifically, 
Chinese hard and soft power policies are examined with a focus on the time period since 
the CCP came to power in China in 1949.   
 7
Historically, the Qing saw Xinjiang as a buffer region important for national 
security.  It opted to co-opt the Uyghurs and rule through local warlords.  In modern 
times, the co-option strategy was cast aside in favor of a policy of assimilation.  CCP 
theorists recognized that Islam is incompatible with communism.  They started a Han 
Chinese forced migration to the region which continues to this day.  The idea was to 
dilute Uyghurs culture with Han influence to the point where only “Chinese” culture 
existed in Xinjiang.  In both cases, force was used, and continues to be used, to ensure 
compliance with Chinese policy.   
E. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION 
These policies will be examined in order to draw out the balance between 
Uyghurs nationalism and their Islamic identity.  The Uyghurs are Muslims yet they do 
not support radical Islam pursuant to their political goals.  There isn’t even much 
evidence that the Uyghur support the radical factions that do exist in Xinjiang even 
though they share the same goal of independence.  Why?  The answer to this question has 
not been adequately addressed in the literature.  This thesis investigates the possibility 
that Uyghurs nationalism is stronger, relatively speaking, than their Islamic identity and 
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II. WHO ARE THE UYGHURS? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Situated in the northwest frontier region of what is now the People’s Republic of 
China, Xinjiang accounts for one-sixth of China’s total land mass.  Its population of 
twenty million people is small relative to the rest of China, but Xinjiang is endowed with 
the largest reserves of mineral wealth in the country.15  Within its borders lie large 
reserves of oil, coal, iron ore, and over one hundred other minerals.  The terrain is as 
diverse as the people in Xinjiang.  There are mountains that remain snow covered year 
round, juxtaposed with semi-arid highland, desert, and inland rivers.  Xinjiang shares 
borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, among 
others.  Today the area is a region of minorities.  There are approximately 47 different 
ethnic groups in Xinjiang, but none forms a majority of the population.16  The larger, 
more significant groups are Mongols, Kazaks, Dongxiang, Hui, and the Uyghurs.  There 
is also a large minority population of Han Chinese.   
Known as the Xinjiang Uyghurs Autonomous Region (XUAR) in modern times, 
the land comprising its current boundaries has only been nominally part of “China” since 
it was annexed during the Qing Dynasty 250 years ago.   
This chapter explains how the Uyghurs came to Xinjiang and how they became 
established.  It explains who the Uyghurs are and how they became who they are.  
Specifically it focuses on the Islamic identity of this people.  Neither Islam nor the 
Uyghurs are indigenous to Xinjiang, yet unrest in the region today is largely the result of 
Uyghurs agitation over issues surrounding their Islamic identity.   
                                                 
15 Demographic information obtained from the 2000 census.  Information accessed at Xinjiang, 
http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/xinjiang.htm.     
16 China.org.cn, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/165014.htm.   
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B. THE SILK ROAD 
The Silk Road passed directly through Xinjiang and it was this ancient trade route 
that brought a rich flow of people and ideas to the region.  The Silk Road contributed 
significantly to the development of Egyptian, Persian, Roman, as well as Chinese 
civilization.  Silk was traded along this route, of course, but there were many other 
commodities as well.  From China, paper making was brought to the rest of the world 
when Arab armies took Chinese prisoners.  Wine and cotton were brought into China 
along this route as well luxury goods such as herbs, ivory, and fragrances.  Buddhism, 
Christianity, and later Islam were imported as well.17   
Probably within a few decades of the Prophet’s flight from Mecca in 622, the Silk 
Road brought Muslims to Xinjiang and into China.  Today, the highest concentration of 
Muslims in Xinjiang still live on land along the ancient Silk Road.  This trade process 
grew into what became known as the “tributary” system whereby luxury goods were 
delivered to the Chinese court from Muslim rulers.  Muslim envoys would be treated to 
lodging and luxury goods that exceeded the value of the tribute.  However, this has 
largely been discarded as historical rhetoric written by Chinese scholars who perceived 
Chinese civilization to be more sophisticated and elevated above other civilizations that it 
traded with.18  Other versions of the history also exist:   
Muhammad had the power to create heaven and earth…He divided the 
moon into two and put it together again…This was in 621, 4th year of the 
Wu-te.  The imperial order was thereupon given to Ou-yang Hsun (keeper 
of the clepsydra) to engrave in seal characters coins for the 
Commencement of the (Islamic?) Era, in order to record the extraordinary 
feat.  After this, (T’ai-) tsung (the Tang emperor) dreamt that he had met a 
saint and waking up frightened he then sent several missions to the saint’s 




                                                 
17 James Millward and Peter Purdue, “Xinjiang: Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region 
through the late Nineteenth Century,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New 
York: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 32.   
18 Jonathon Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1997), 26. 
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in 30 volumes comprising 114 sura and 6666 verses to offer the 
emperor…T’ai-tsung edited it and promulgated it throughout the empire, 
and the faith flourished in China.19 
 Though Muslims traveled through China to trade, they were discouraged from 
staying long.  Local laws in most major cities required that they trade in specially 
designated areas, restricted their movement among Chinese, and prohibited 
intermarriage.20  Despite these restrictions, some Muslims did stay and intermarry.  
During the Song dynasty, at the end of the twelfth century, Muslim traders had 
established themselves in most of the major Chinese cities along the Silk Road.  By then 
local laws and customs had changed, de facto, and allowed community settlement.  Since 
very few Muslim women traveled to China, intermarriage between Muslim men and 
Chinese women was the norm in these communities.  In this way, Muslim and Chinese 
cultures were synthesized.  After several centuries of this practice, Muslim communities 
in China had taken on their own identity and no longer identified strictly with either of 
their constituent entities.   
C. POPULATION MOVEMENT 
Though the Silk Road was the original point of entry for many Muslims in ancient 
China, it would be simply wrong to understand the growth of the community as 
expanding outward into China along the Silk Road.  This is especially true in Xinjiang.  
The Türks of central Asia (not to be confused with modern day Turks), Arabs, Tibetans, 
and the Chinese among others all played a role in shaping modern day Xinjiang.  
Throughout its history, as today, the area has been flush with political activity and a 
melting pot of ideologies.  When the first Muslims arrived in Xinjiang, the area was not 
even “Chinese.”   
At the beginning of the seventh century Xinjiang was largely Türkic, Persian, and 
Indo-Eupropean.  There were very few Chinese.  The leadership of the Tang dynasty 
(618-906) held sway over the region for a short time through alliances with local elites.  
This pre-modern practice was common all over the world at the time as a means of 
                                                 
19  Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 72.  
20 Ibid. 
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extending influence past the limits of existing logistic and communication apparatuses.  
The relationship between the Tang and locals in Xinjiang was often strained.  Because of 
its value to interstate trade, influence in the Tarim Basin was continuously contested by 
outside forces.   
D. THE UYGHURS 
 Significantly, it was during this period in the eighth century that the Uyghurs 
arrived in Xinjiang.  Though today Uyghurs are synonymous with the region, they did not 
originate in Xinjiang and they were not originally Muslim.  They came from the Orkhon 
River Valley region of Mongolia where, after overthrowing the local Türkic rulers, and 
establishing their own khahate, they were attacked and dispersed by the Kyrgyz from the 
north.21  Many of the Uyghurs tribes resettled further south in Xinjiang, where they made 
their home in the city of Khocho.   
Favorable weather conditions and satisfactory relations with the Tang and other 
surrounding neighbors permitted Uyghurs agriculture to flourish and it was for these 
reasons that they settled permanently in the region.  The relationships cultivated by the 
Uyghurs were complex.  The Chinese, for example, depended on their Uyghurs neighbors 
for trade and protection.  Thus, although the relationship was officially one of tribute by 
the Uyghurs, in reality it was more equal because the Uyghurs could not be easily 
subdued.22   
E. UYGHURS RELIGION 
Uyghurs religion could at first be characterized as Manichaen, an early Persian 
religion with many parallels to Christianity that was founded in the third century a.d. by 
the Persian prophet Mani.  Originally, Manichaen practice was embraced mostly by the 
upper classes while the lower classes held onto shamanic rituals.  Later Buddhism was 
embraced and even Christianity to a certain extent.   
                                                 
21 Millward and Perdue, 40. 
22 Christian Tyler, Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2004), 44.  
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 The boundaries of Xinjiang have been redrawn many times through history.  
During the reign of the Uyghurs kings (the ninth through the eleventh centuries), it was 
no different.  The area was divided into providences much as it is today, but included 
territory that is not part of present day Xinjiang.  It is interesting to note that the Uyghurs 
held power in Xinjiang longer than any other group.23  Ultimately it was the 
Karakhanids, a federation of Turkic tribes, that brought Islam to Xinjiang and the 
Uyghurs.  Millward and Perdue place these events in proper historical perspective.   
It was the Karakhanids who linked the western Tarim basin to the Islamic 
world of Transoxiana and parts west, and under their rule the Turks and 
much of Xinjiang’s population became Muslims.  The conversion of the 
Turks to Islam was an event of world-historical significance, for the 
Karakhanids went on to destroy the Samanid dynasty (1000) and assume 
control of firmly Muslim Transoxiana; they would be only the first of a 
series of Turkic ruling dynasties in Central Asia and the Middle East.24   
 Official revisionist versions of the story attribute the feat to one man: Satuk 
Bughra Khan.  According to the story, young Satuk was converted to Islam from 
Buddhism, and after narrowly escaping death by his uncle, he went on to nearly single 
handedly spread Islam through Xinjiang and the rest of central Asia.   
F. SUFISM  
 The history of Islam in Xinjiang cannot be separated from the story of the 
Uyghurs and bears further explanation.  The Sunni Sufi Islam that was imported into 
Xinjiang was probably able to take root in part because the mystical qualities of Sufism 
fit the belief system that was already in place.  An answer to Orthodox Sunni Islam, 
Sufism is intended to bring the individual closer to God through personalized religious 
experience.  The teachings and practice employ much greater use of parable and allegory 
than more traditional or orthodox Islamic sects.  Significantly, Sufis also place great 
emphasis on teaching in small groups, another facet of the religion that was probably 
originally appealing to the Uyghurs.  It is also important to realize how the practice of 
incorporating existing beliefs and ritual into a new religion has produced a brand of Islam 
                                                 
23  Tyler, Wild West China,  41.   
24 Ibid., 42.   
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in northwest China that is like no other anywhere else.  Tenets of Buddhist and Confucian 
thought which emphasize harmony with the environment, personal enlightenment, and 
self-restraint as well as elements of secular Turkic culture can be seen in the practice of 
Islam there today.  The word “dilution” has been used to describe this process, but that 
description is not accurate.  In fact, the process has enriched the religious experience of 
the Uyghurs in a way that is unique to them.  However one might argue this point, it is 
important to understand that the coming of Islam to Xinjiang deepened the cultural divide 
that existed and still exists between the people of the area and China proper.  In the words 
of Fuller and Lipman, “Muslim rulers in Central Asia could not admit any inferiority to 
the pagan [Chinese], just as no self-respecting Chinese could view the Turks as anything 
but barbarians.”25   
G. MONGOL INFLUENCE AND THE RETURN OF THE CHINESE 
 The Mongols came to Xinjiang again (1218) when the armies of Genghis Khan 
spread Mongol influence throughout Asia and much of Europe.  The Uyghurs seem to 
have faired better than most conquered peoples as their valuable resources in the form of 
soldiers to resupply Genghis Khan’s armies and literate, competent administrators were 
immediately recognized and capitalized on by the Mongols.  As the Mongols had a 
practice of religious tolerance, often adopting the indigenous religion, the now largely 
Islamic (though Buddhism and Christianity were still prevalent) Xinjiang region enjoyed 
relative peace with the new khan.26   
 The Chinese would return again to Xinjiang after the Manchu Qing dynasty was 
established in the seventeen century.  After the decline of the Mongol empire four 
hundred years before, the Xinjiang region had been ruled by an unremarkable chain of 
mostly Muslim khans.  The Qing secured the region and made it part of their empire 
through a series of hard fought and devastating battles.  It was during this time that the  
 
 
                                                 
25 Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipman. “Xinjiang: Islam in Xinjiang” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim 
Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 327. 
26Tyler, Wild West China, 50. 
 15
Qing renamed the area Xinjiang, which means “new frontier” reflecting their attitude 
toward their new conquest.  With little exception, it has remained part of what is now 
China to this day.   
 The Qing was able to successfully rule over its outer territories through co-option 
and empowerment of local elites.  Xinjiang was just one of many territories that were 
administered in this way.  The formula for Xinjiang was a little different than other 
territories, which reflected the Qing’s willingness to accommodate local conditions in 
order to effect good governance.  The military came first to Xinjiang with the intention of 
setting garrison posts along the outer borders of the region.  This proved too costly, 
however, and the Qing soon began to offer land as incentive for soldiers to have their 
families join them and settle permanently in the region in order to increase the tax base.  
Taxes, in the form of grain collected at harvest, were high because maintaining soldiers at 
garrison was considered vital for national security.  The Qing also promoted migration.  
20,000 families had migrated to the region by 1781 with assistance from the state.27  
Further, in order to make Xinjiang more dependent on China proper, trade was carefully 
regulated.  Incentives were offered to merchants to trade with China and trade routes 
between Xinjiang and Russia and between Xinjiang and Mongolia were carefully 
controlled.   
 Qing efforts had resulted in a territory whose frontiers were controlled by soldier-
farmers, had a large migrant population, high taxes, and ultimately whose revenues were 
unable to meet expenditures.  The net result is that imperial rule did not completely take 
root in Xinjiang.  Worse, it was not clear to the Qing what the best way forward was for 
Xinjiang.  Then, as today, domestic and international security concerns were tied together 
in such a way that satisfying both was not always possible in concert.  For example, 
Xinjiang was repeatedly invaded by the Kashgar region, yet an increase in troop strength 
to deter such attacks was considered too expensive.28 
                                                 
27 Millward and Perdue, 58. 
28 Ibid., 61. 
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H. THE UYGHURS AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 
 The history of the relationship between the region and modern day China dates 
back to the beginning of communist rule.  The area was “liberated” by the fledgling CCP 
on October 20, 1949.  In the wake of civil war and Nationalist rule, most people in 
Xinjiang probably embraced the “liberators” and the fresh hope that the change carried 
with it.  The actual administration of the area, however, was more problematic for the 
Chinese.  The non-Han nationalities of China’s outer territories fit into the new 
communist ideology and society about as well as Native Americans fit into the Western 
European ideology that was established in America two centuries ago.  PRC theorists 
decided upon a regional autonomy system since China’s minorities are all, generally 
speaking, very different from each other.  Recognizing the need to hold onto its territory 
for strategic reasons, the PRC’s new system would grant limited autonomy to non-Han 
people living within the boundaries of the PRC.  It was thought that ultimately non-Han 
Chinese could be assimilated into CCP ideology.  Under this new mantra, Xinjiang would 
become the “Uyhgur Autonomous Region” and later (1955) the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) with a certain degree of freedom in governance over its 
own affairs.   
The key difference between the Qing system and the modern-day system is that 
whereas the Qing sought the use of local elites to co-opt the Uyghurs, the PRC has 
pursued policy with the goal of remaking Uyghurs society into a uniform “Chinese” 
society while balancing the concern that imposing too many restrictions on the local 
minorities could result in them unifying against the state.  The same is true for nearly all 
of China’s other provinces with autonomous minority populations with the notable 
exception of Tibet during the 1950s.  Communist ideology does not, at least at face value, 
allow for the appreciation of local interests, and since all politics is local, the system has 
not performed any better than the Qing system in terms of tightening the bonds of loyalty 




PRC interest in Xinjiang today however, has more to do with natural resources 
than it does with ideology.  Xinjiang has huge deposits of coal, oil, and other minerals.  
The Chinese economy demands these resources, thus Beijing has a very tangible reason 
to maintain peace with and within Xinjiang.   
I. THE UYGHURS TODAY 
 The politics surrounding the East Turkistan Independence Movement are dealt 
with at length in other parts of this thesis.  However, to understand who the Uyghurs are, 
it is important to understand how the movement reflects who they are.  In order to do 
that, this thesis focuses on the Islamic identity of the Uyghurs.  As Muslims, the Uyghurs 
reject the secular government of China.  One of the basic tenets of Islam is that prosperity 
of the religion is linked directly to the success of the state.  This view is, of course, in 
direct opposition to communist ideology.  It will be argued later that this tension has been 
exacerbated by the Chinese policy of installing Han Chinese as local communist party 
officials in Xinjiang instead of using local elites.  The important point here is that the 
Uyghurs have a daily reminder of the incongruity between their religion and the Chinese 
state.   
 The PRC utilizes a state family planning system or “one child policy.”  The 
background of the current policy is filled with U-turns and roadblocks, but it was 
implemented under Deng Xiaoping in 1980 as a means to ensure continued economic 
growth.  Again, the policy flies in the face of the basic tenets of Islam which encourage 
large prosperous families.  The policy is unevenly applied in the country and more 
uneven still in application amongst China’s minorities.  Unfortunately for the Uyghurs, 
the law is applied rather strictly in Xinjiang.  This is probably because the state 
understands the meaning of having a large family in Islam.  Unfortunately for the state, 
strict application of the policy has done nothing to enamor the Uyghurs with the PRC.   
 Finally, the state has imposed strict rules about attending mosque on the Uyghurs.  
Specifically, state officials and school children are prohibited from attending during 
certain times and prayer is not allowed during the day.  In Islam, performance of the 
prayer five times a day is again one of the most basic tenets of the religion.  For the state 
to deny a Muslim prayer is to deny them who they are.   
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 The PRC laws are essentially denying the Uyghurs their Islamic identity.  Though 
there are many reasons behind the East Turkistan Independence Movement, this is one of 
the most important.   
J. CONCLUSIONS 
 The Uyghurs have a rich history.  Since their arrival in the Tarim Basim during 
the eighth century, they have become a part of the landscape in Xinjiang.  Their identity 
has been forged over centuries of hardship through encounters with invading armies, 
occupying forces, intolerant governments, and Islam among other influences.  Their 
experience has taught them that in order to have their own identity, they need to be 
independent of the PRC.   
 Modern Uyghur disenchantment with the PRC is grouped into three categories in 
this thesis so they can be dealt with using empirical data.  Though it may be possible to 
list another twenty reasons that the Uyghurs want independence, it would probably also 
be true that each would fall into one of these three categories.   
 First, Islam is incompatible with communism.  This is because in Islam the 
success of the religion is linked directly to the success of the state.  It is also worth 
mentioning here that communism is secular by definition and therefore incompatible with 
any religion, not just Islam.   
 Second, the Chinese are oppressive, at least from the Uyghurs perspective.  The 
structure of the government in Xinjiang and government affirmative action policies 
discriminate against Uyghurs.  For example, affirmative action ensures equal opportunity 
only for government jobs.  However, in Xinjiang, all the good jobs are in the private 
sector, specifically in the manufacturing industry.  The Uyghur are noncompetitive for 
these jobs.  Human rights violations that have been endured by the Uyghurs also fall into 
this category.  In recent times it has been suggested that the best way for the United 
States to prevent the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism in Xinjiang is to support the 
Uyghurs through multilateral human rights initiatives.  This is one way to force more 
transparency in the Chinese government and remove one of the touchstones of instability 
in the region.   
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 Finally, the Uyghurs are sitting on a gold mine of natural resources that are being 
exploited by the PRC.  Many Uyghurs feel those resources could be put to better use by 
the Uyghurs.  The mineral wealth in Xinjiang and potential for its use has been well 
documented elsewhere and will not be given more than passing mention in this thesis.   
 In sum, Xinjiang is rich in mineral wealth.  The Uyghur reject Chinese intolerance 
of their religious practice and discriminatory government policy that unfairly gives 








 After the liberation of Xinjiang in 1949, Communist Party policy toward the 
Uyghurs had less to do with Marxist-Leninist theory than with the consolidation of power 
for the PRC.  Before the communists, Xinjiang was ruled by local warlords who were 
part of the Eastern Turkistan Republic at times and proxies of the Nationalist Chinese 
government at other times.  Now Xinjiang was controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).  Though party theorists crafted a broad strategy to assimilate all of China’s 
minorities into the new China of Marxist-Leninist communism, the strategy for Xinjiang 
was built on the assumption that the Uyghurs (and the other minorities of the region) 
were second-class citizens.  They were generally regarded as dirty barbarians by the Han 
Chinese and their Islamic belief system was seen as an outdated relic of the non-
enlightened.   
B. HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER 
This chapter explains some of the most significant methods of control that Beijing 
has used and continues to use for the purpose of maintaining Xinjiang as part of the PRC 
and controlling dissent there.  Specifically, it focuses on the period between 1949 and 
1990.  During this time, many methods of controlling and assimilating the Uyghurs were 
tried with varying degrees of success.  After 1990, economic priorities changed the way 
that Beijing dealt with Xinjiang.   
Specifically, “hard power” and “soft power” tactics is examined.  “Soft power” 
was a Cold War term originally used to describe how the West tried to influence people 
behind the Iron Curtain.  Here is will be defined as Chinese policy meant to achieve a 
specific objective in Xinjiang for the CCP without the use of force.  It could be said that 
Chinese policy toward the Uyghurs has been a success.  If the metric for success is 
whether Xinjiang remains part of the PRC, then this is certainly true.  Why have the 
Uyghurs not broken away from China if the Chinese are such terrible, oppressive 
overlords?  Why have the Uyghurs not united behind their religion for this purpose?   
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“Hard power,” as used here, refers to the application of force to enforce Beijing’s 
policies in Xinjiang.   Similarly, Uyghurs nationalism and Islamic identity are examined 
in this context.  Hard power and soft power are easy to distinguish from the Chinese 
perspective.  All of their policies regarding their minorities are based on soft power.  The 
use of force to quiet discontent or enforce policy is classified as hard power.  It is 
important to draw a distinction between the two and examine each because neither would 
succeed alone and both have shaped Uyghurs identity differently.   
C. NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY 
This chapter further examines what effect those policies have had on nationalism 
and Islamic identity of the Uyghurs and how that effect has influenced the methods used 
by the Uyghurs to achieve their political objectives.  Due to the fundamental 
incompatibility of their religion with the secular government of China and other Chinese 
polices that discussed here; there are several Uyghur political movements afoot to 
separate Xinjiang from China.  Significantly, the Uyghurs have not radicalized in order to 
achieve this goal, which is to say there is very little evidence of Islamic fundamentalism 
in Xinjiang.  To be fair, the Chinese government has identified at least six terrorist groups 
in Xinjiang today.29  Also to be fair, it is very difficult to get accurate government 
information on issues like this, and since there is no free press in China, it is often 
difficult to get any objective information at all.  A survey of all the literature, however, 
paints a picture of a Turkic, Islamic population with a very small radical element.  Here 
“very small” is defined to mean that the activities of the fundamentalists do not seem 
consonant with the broader political will of the people.  Though there are several active 
movements to separate Xinjiang from the PRC and there are radical elements that support 
these movements, there is no broad popular support for these activities and thus there has 
been no tangible political change.  The radical elements are small, fringe organizations.  
Even if all the government data on these groups are to be believed, they still lack 
indigenous funding, training, and recruiting mechanisms.  Clearly the Uyghurs as a whole 
                                                 
29 Jing-Dong Yuan, “China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Anti-Terrorism and Beijing’s 
Central Asia Policy, ” Politologiske Studier 6, no. 2, 132. 
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do not see radical Islam as a path to political change.  It is important to understand the 
Uyghurs nationalism and Islamic identity in this context in order to understand why.   
Identity is complex and ever changing.  Depending on the context, a person will 
identity himself different ways.  In order to understand how to mobilize the political will 
of the Uyghurs, it is necessary to understand how they identify themselves.    
Since 1949, Chinese policy regarding the Uyghurs can best be described as non-
linear.  There have fits and starts, U-turns and changes, and this process continues to this 
day.  There are three reasons for this.  First, there is a fundamental dichotomy between 
the secular Chinese government and the Muslim belief system in Xinjiang.  Since the 
success of the state is tied to the success of religion in Islam, the Uyghurs reject the 
secular government at the most basic level.  Second, Xinjiang lies far out in the 
northwestern corner of the PRC.  As such, the line between domestic and international 
policy is blurred and often the two are incompatible.  For example, since the attacks of 
9/11 Beijing has in some cases labeled Uyghurs organizations as terrorist cells30 and 
cracked down on them in order to be perceived as taking a hard line in the war against 
terrorism.  At home, however, there is a need to maintain peace in Xinjiang to keep its 
mineral wealth flowing into the Chinese economy.  Finally, the ideological path of the 
CCP has changed through the years.  The Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap 
Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and Mao’s death were turbulent times for China, 
including Xinjiang.   
 The first few years of communist rule was a pivotal time period in many respects, 
but especially so for newly regained Xinjiang.  Hammering the Uyghurs into the 
communist mold was going to be a very formidable task for the CCP, and at first there 
was a relatively large measure of religious and political freedom.  The communist 
Chinese had little in common with their new countrymen in the Northwest.  Uyghurs 
speech, dress, mannerisms, religion, and politics were all unfamiliar.  Further, the 
Uyghurs had formed their own ideas about their heritage and had developed a strong 
sense of nationalism.   
                                                 
30 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one of the most prominent examples. 
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On two different occasions prior to the 1946-49 civil war, Xinjiang had been a 
sovereign state.  For brief periods during the twentieth century, the area was known as the 
Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR).  In trying to understand the Uyghurs experience in the 
contemporary context, it has been argued that Uyghurs separatist tendencies are the result 
of the rise of Han Chinese nationalism in the wake of the Cold War.31  Such an 
assessment discounts much Uyghurs history.  There is a clear history of nationalism 
among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.   
D. COMMUNIST RULE 
Though the Communists were welcomed initially because relations with the 
Nationalists during the civil war were sub par, they were certainly regarded with caution 
by the Uyghurs.  Beijing also had the influence of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang to worry 
about.  Though the region was now technically part of the PRC, communist rule had by 
no means taken root there yet.  If Beijing demanded change too quickly, the Uyghurs 
might turn to the Soviet Union as a better alternative than the Chinese or they might 
decide they would be better off as an independent state.   
 Beijing viewed Xinjiang as a strategic asset much as the Qing had done centuries 
earlier.  The land itself was important for security reasons and the mineral resources in 
the region were important as well.  The CCP struggled and continues to struggle, just as 
the Qing had to emplace policy for Xinjiang that could adequately address domestic and 
international concerns.  Unlike the more pragmatic approach of the Qing, the CCP 
decided on a divide, and assimilate strategy for the region.  The ultimate goal according 
to Wang Enmao, the first party secretary of Xinjiang in 1965, was  
to maintain actively the facade of regional autonomy for the [the Uyghurs 
and other minorities]…while at the same time adopting measures that 
would gradually make them and the territory they inhabited, 
unquestionably Chinese.32   
                                                 
31 See Abanti Bhattacharya, “Conceptualizing Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” Strategic 
Analysis 27, no. 3 (2003) for an overview of this argument.   
32 Donald McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang (Boulder: Westview, 1979), 
129. 
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First they identified thirteen different historical minority groups that had 
originally inhabited Xinjiang.33  Then they established a regional government that gave 
each minority a measure of representation and control effectively established competition 
among them.  The PRC was composed of several “minority regions” of which Xinjiang 
was only one.  It feared that its minorities could potentially band together to threaten 
communist rule.  By dividing the minorities against each other, the ties of each to the 
central government would be strengthened.   
 Next, the ranks of local government were purged in order to remove any Soviet 
influence that might be lingering.  The top echelons of the government were replaced 
with Han party loyals imported from back east.  While the fledgling regional government 
was being setting up, the PLA arrived to administer affairs in Xinjiang.  The first group 
of communist officials was generally well received34 because they were, generally 
speaking, able administrators.  According to Uyghur historical documents, however, it 
may be more accurate to say that Mao went back on his promise of self-determination for 
the region.  Either way, Marxist-Leninist doctrine does not support self-determination.  It 
was thought that smaller states that were supported by ideology different from socialism 
would eventually fold.  Thus the rhetoric of the time called for China’s minorities to 
stand together with the Han to prevent the crumbling capitalist ideology to penetrate the 
country.35   
Beijing also immediately began a forced migration of Han Chinese to the region.  
Xinjiang is a land of minorities.  Even today, there is no majority ethnic group.  PRC 
theorists decided that Han influence in the region would be the primary mechanism of 
assimilating the Uyghurs and the other minorities into broader Chinese society.  It was 
thought that having Han live among the Uyghurs would help spread the party message 
and eventually absorb the minorities completely into the new society.  It retrospect, this 
plan was doomed to have undesirable side effects from the start for several reasons.  
                                                 
33 Gardner Bovingdon, “Heteronomy and Its Discontents: Minzu Regional Autonomy in Xinjiang,” in 
Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington, 2004), 
117.   
34 Tyler, Wild West China, 133. 
35 Ibid., 143. 
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First, most of the immigrants were forced to move to the region because they were 
politically undesirable elsewhere.  Unhappy about being separated from their homes and 
families and unfamiliar with the language and culture of Xinjiang, the new arrivals did 
not make fast friends.  Second, Han Chinese were given preferential treatment in almost 
all manner of legal discourse.  It is not clear why this is so, but it can most likely be 
attributed to prejudice by the Han against their frontier cousins.  In the 1950s there were 
almost no Han in Xinjiang, whereas today, they make up nearly half the population.  
Thus, the policy was a success from the perspective of increasing Han influence in 
region.  Interestingly, though there has always been government mandated incentives to 
encourage Han migration to Xinjiang, only during the 1990s did migration reach its peak 
due to economic incentives.  During this period of wild economic growth, there was great 
opportunity to cash in on the industrial and mineral potential in Xinjiang.36 
The real challenge for Beijing, however, was that the Uyghurs power base was 
and is inexorably intertwined with Islam.  In order to replace the existing system of 
governance in Xinjiang, it would be more difficult than simply purging local officials and 
replacing them with party loyals.  Since the real power base lay in the Muslim clergy and 
ruling elites, it would be necessary to “reform” these individuals to avoid tearing apart 
the very fabric that held Uyghurs society together.  The CCP dealt with this problem 
through the China Islamic Association, a state sponsored organization with the mission of 
helping Chinese Muslims live in harmony with the socialist state.  It controlled who was 
elected Imam and how mosques were adorned.37   
 Finally, land reform measures were implemented.  Peasants were given land of 
their own to work for two reasons.  First, taking land away from the local landlords set 
the stage for collectivization that would follow.  Second, it won Beijing a measure of 
support among peasants in Xinjiang.  Land reform is also the most effective mechanism 
Beijing had to undermine the deeply rooted Islamic power base in Xinjiang.  Islamic tithe 
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was the main source of support for mosques in the region.  With the land reform, Beijing 
was able to cut off their source of revenue and thus reduce their influence.38   
 During the 1950s, until the end of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, there was 
relative peace as the Uyghurs learned to live with their new masters in Beijing.  There 
was religious tolerance, albeit state supervised, and the XUAR was formally established 
in 1955, giving the Uyghurs control of local government affairs.  As the decade drew to a 
close, however, tightening of the political noose from Beijing in response to the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign and the realization that the Han migration to Xinjiang was nothing 
more than Chinese colonialism soon began to cause tension. 
 The Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) did nothing to settle Uyghurs concerns 
about Chinese rule.  In Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, famine was the rule.  In 
Xinjiang, however, the worst was yet to come.  Mao’s ultra-left policies of the time 
ushered in the party’s religious reform movement that specifically targeted Islam and 
other policies designed to root out “local nationalism.”39  The thinking at the time was 
that cultural homogenization would aid the Leap forward.40  There were also somewhat 
unexpected consequences in terms of population movement.  Due to starvation in the 
interior, migration to Xinjiang hit an all time high during this period and Uyghurs 
defections across the border into the Soviet Union did as well.41  The net result was that a 
greater military presence appeared in Xinjiang to close the border with the Soviet Union.  
The secondary effect, of course, was a greater central influence in the region.  These 
policies were successful from the perspective of Beijing.  By the early 1960s, its 
penetration into local government was deeper in Xinjiang than it had been at any point in 
the past.  Of course Uyghur resentment of the Chinese government was deeper than at 
any point in the past as well. 
 Similarly, cultural differences were not allowed during the Cultural Revolution 
and it was more of the same, if not even more brutal and intolerant.  The Uyghurs were 
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39 Ibid., 94.   
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not the targets of the Red Guards and Mao’s brutal policy, but they and other minorities 
were the victims.  Mosques were burned during this time and clerics were subject to all 
manner of humiliation.  In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the pendulum swung 
again, though not for long.   
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms again changed the calculus between 
Beijing and the Uyghurs.  In place of the brutal intolerance to cultural differences, there 
was a return to pragmatism and a relaxing of restrictions on religious practice.  These 
changes were certainly welcomed by most in Xinjiang42 and these reforms probably 
allowed the most religious and political freedom to date by the CCP, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the new policy of tolerance improved relations at all between the Uyghurs 
and Beijing.   
It was also during this time, however (1979), that China began state-sponsored 
family planning, commonly known as the “one child policy.”  What began as a measure 
to ensure the growth of China’s population did not outgrow its food supply quickly 
became the source of hostility between Beijing and the Uyghurs.  Islam encourages 
Muslims to have large families.  There are many references to this in the Koran, and 
clearly restrictions on family planning were not well tolerated by the Uyghurs.  In 
fairness, there is only a small population within China that is restricted to one child.  For 
most families in rural areas, where most Uyghurs live, they are allowed two children if 
the first child is a girl.  Nonetheless, the Uyghurs have been very outspoken on this point.  
It is another example of the incompatibility of communism and Islam.  Despite the 
downturn at the end of the 1970’s, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were generally welcomed by 
the Uyghurs and relative peace and prosperity lay ahead.   
The 1980’s were largely a peaceful time for the Uyghurs.  The economic reforms 
of Deng Xiaoping brought prosperity to the region and life was generally better than it 
had been at any time under communist rule.  However the events in Tiananmen Square in 
1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union shortly thereafter changed all that again for 
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the Uyghurs.  Perhaps the touchstone event during this period for Beijing was the Baren 
riot of April, 1990.  Depending on which source is to be believed, between twenty and 
one hundred people were killed as PRC officials cracked down on a demonstration march 
to demand greater religious freedom in Xinjiang.   
Beijing was worried about losing control of the population to protest movements 
within China, and it worried about the influence of the new republics that now 
surrounded Xinjiang.  These were the states created from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Again, even though the Uyghurs were not targets of the backlash to the 
crackdown on Tiananmen protesters, they were victims of it in that minority dissent was 
not tolerated.  Further, the new economic reality created in the vacuum of Soviet 
influence meant great opportunity for China.  In order to capitalize on this, new policy 
regarding Xinjiang was forthcoming.   
The new policies and political realities of the 1990s added another layer of 
complexity to the relationship between China and Xinjiang.  This time period saw a sharp 
increase in violence and terrorist acts, as reported by the state media.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The period of time from the beginning of communist rule to 1990 saw the modern 
formation of the relationship between Beijing and the Uyghur.  The new ideology of the 
PRC, as well as changing economic and political conditions during this time, were 
instrumental in forming the new relationship.   
Beijing viewed Xinjiang as a strategic asset much as the Qing had done centuries 
earlier.  The land itself was important for security reasons and the mineral resources in 
the region were important as well.  Unlike the more pragmatic approach of the Qing, the 
CCP decided on a divide, and assimilate strategy for the region.  The Chinese went to 
great lengths to set up a local government structure that offered the appearance of limited 
autonomy while simultaneously keeping the real reigns of power firmly in the grasp of 
the communist party.   
The real challenge for Beijing, however, was that the Uyghurs power base was 
and is inexorably intertwined with Islam.  In order for a new political idea to gain traction 
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in Xinjiang, it must be written in the language of Islam.  In order to replace the existing 
system of governance in Xinjiang, it would be more difficult than simply purging local 
officials and replacing them with party loyals.  Since the real power base lay in the 
Muslim clergy and ruling elites, they could not simply be purged.  The CCP dealt with 
this problem through organizations such as the China Islamic Association, a state 
sponsored organization with the mission of helping Chinese Muslims live in harmony 
with the socialist state.  The real mission of these organizations, however, was the 
assimilation of Islam into “Chinese” society.  By controlling all aspects of the religion, 
from who would be elected Imam to when and who could worship, the state sought to 
usurp the sway the clergy held over the masses.   
Ultimately, while the groundwork was laid for PRC relations with the Uyghurs in 
the modern era during this time, Beijing’s policies ultimately failed to assimilate the 
Uyghurs into “Chinese” society.  In fact, Han discrimination against minorities often 
operated counter to Beijing’s assimilation policies.  The Chinese were not able to provide 
enough incentive for the Uyghurs to want to be part of their society even though they 
were successful in keeping Xinjiang part of China.  As a result, “Chinese” values and 
ideas did not become part of the identity of modern Uyghurs.  In fact, Uyghurs turned to 




IV. 1990 TO THE PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The 1990s saw a sharp increase in violence in Xinjiang.  In the wake of 
Tiananmen Square protests, the government felt that it was losing its grip on the 
population to a movement that was born of economic reforms a decade earlier.  
Additionally, the new political reality created by the collapse of the Soviet Union also 
added to the complexity of the situation.  Beijing was concerned about the influence the 
new Central Asia republics that had been created on Xinjiang’s borders would have.  
Specifically, it was concerned about cross-border cultivation of separatist ideas.  Also, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union also left a large power vacuum in Central Asia that 
offered opportunity for China.  It wished to increase its influence in the region in order to 
gain access to mineral wealth to fuel the growing, capitalistic economy.   
B.  THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 
 This marked a turning point for China in its relations with Xinjiang.  The days of 
ideological campaigns against ethnic minority populations were now replaced by the 
pragmatic realities and needs of the new economic system and security environment.  
Then, just a decade later, the terrorist attacks of September 11 added another layer of 
complexity to the calculus.  Now, in addition to the demands of the Chinese economy and 
outside influence in Xinjiang, Beijing also has had to carefully balance the need to appear 
tough on terrorism in the international sphere while dealing with the separatist tendencies 
of the Uyghurs.  At a time when Beijing was putting more effort than it ever had into 
tightening the bonds between Xinjiang and the PRC, several Uyghurs separatist 
organizations were labeled as terrorist cells and harsh action was taken against them.  The 
methodology employed by Beijing to meet these seemingly incompatible needs are 
examined in this chapter.  From the early 1990s onward, policy in Xinjiang has taken on 
a distinctly new tone.  As a result, so has the Uyghurs response.  Since this time, the party 
has employed new methods to deal with the age old problem regarding Xinjiang.  How 
can they offer a measure of autonomy that will satisfy the Uyghurs and thus keep 
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Xinjiang as part of the PRC without encouraging local nationalism and thus ultimately 
separatist sentiments?  This chapter examines the policy changes, and the Uyghurs 
response in the context of the balance between Uyghur nationalism and Islamic identity.   
 The problem was more acute now than ever and is exemplified in the policy of 
reopening Xinjiang’s borders to the world.  This was done in the early 1990s as a means 
to encourage trade with Xinjiang’s new neighbors in exchange for security guarantees 
that no state would interfere in the internal affairs of Xinjiang.  The policy has produced 
mixed results.  As Sean Roberts points out, the move has greatly increased China’s 
influence in Central Asia to the point where some countries there fear Sinification.  On 
the other hand, the renewal of cross-border cultural ties has agitated the Uyghurs more 
vigorously toward separatism.43  By the same token, the greater religious freedom 
allowed since 1978, combined with the reopening of Xinjiang’s borders since the 1990s 
has produced an inflow of resources into Xinjiang for the purpose of building mosques 
and other religious rituals.  Combined with greater exposure that Muslims in Xinjiang 
now had with its Islamic neighbors, it is logical to conclude these circumstances would 
deepen the piety of the average Muslim in Xinjiang.   
 Historically in China, it has been minorities that suffered the most during times of 
change.  This was seen at the start of the 1990s.  The Hundred Flowers Campaign, The 
Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution are all examples that come quickly to 
mind.  Communist ideology in China grew out of historical roots that emphasized 
uniformity.  Minority cultures with unfamiliar language, custom, and in the case of the 
Uyghurs, religion, have always been a source of friction in China.  Thus minorities are a 
natural target when the government clamps down on dissent.  The wave of violence in 
Xinjiang during the 1990s could perhaps best be described as a relationship of reciprocity 
between the Uyghurs and the local government.  It would be wrong to say that the 
Uyghurs suddenly became more violent and the government simply responded.   
 PRC policy makers saw that the policies most likely to succeed in all of China’s 
territories, including Xinjiang, were those that created tighter bonds with Beijing.  There 
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Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 
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are three reasons cited for this by Beijing.  First, it conforms to Chinese historical values 
in that “China has been centralized and united over a long period of time.”  Second, since 
China’s minorities are distributed over vast a geographical area and bonds have 
developed between them and the Chinese, “cooperation and mutual assistance, rather 
than separation, is the best choice for them.”  Finally, now as in the past, all of China’s 
ethnic groups are united against imperialism and the evils of outside influence.44 
C.  CHINESE RESPONSE 
Beijing’s goals were four-fold.  First, influence of the new republics that were 
created after the collapse of the Soviet Union should be minimized.  Second, 
infrastructure and communication links between Xinjiang and its neighbors should be 
strengthened.  Third, law enforcement presence in the region should be increased to quell 
unrest as soon as it appeared.  Finally, incentives to increase Han migration to the area 
should be maximized.45   
 On the first point, China initiated vigorous diplomatic relations with newly 
formed Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia.  These states now bordered 
Xinjiang and Beijing sought security assurances that these states would not interfere 
internally with the region.  By all accounts, this effort has been a success.   
 Communication and infrastructure were strengthened by the influx of resources to 
improve road and rail transport for trade purposes.  For example, the rail line from 
Urumchi to the Kazak border was in completed in 1992.  The “Go West” plan of 1999 
triggered further large infrastructure investment programs.  Economic zones which 
provided favorable trade incentives were set up in Xinjiang to encourage growth.  Fiscal 
policy was also overhauled which allowed Xinjiang to pay less tax to the state and 
provided tax benefits which encouraged business growth and investment.46  There were 
social programs which paralleled these economic programs as well.  Uyghurs were given 
‘preferential’ treatment with regard to finding jobs in state institutions (during this time, 
                                                 
44 Chinese Whitepaper. “Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities,” 
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45 Nicholas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” The China Journal no.44 (2000): 67.   
46 Ibid., 71. 
 34
Xinjiang had the highest rate of state owned companies in China) and college entry 
(special provisions were made to allow Uyghurs to enter school with lower test scores).  
These policies were part of a broader affirmative action initiative in China meant to close 
the gap between Han Chinese and the ethnic minorities.  At first glance, these policies 
seem like they would be a great benefit to the Uyghurs.  Barry Sautman has written on 
the successes of these programs as a counterexample to the argument “that affirmative 
action everywhere fails to produce substantial equity, inhibits economic efficiency and 
creates inter-ethnic tensions.”47  However, as Bovingdon points out, even Sautman 
recognizes that these initiatives ultimately fail to address the underlying problem.  
Uyghurs are less likely to go to high school and college because their roots are much 
more rural.  Also, as Bovingdon points out, the quota system only applies to government 
run industry and has no effect on the much more lucrative private sector.  As a result, the 
Uyghurs will be left further behind as the economy continues to grow.   
Several new initiatives were started for the purpose of squeezing Uyghurs identity 
to the margins more thoroughly than had been possible in the past, and hard power was 
employed to enforce laws already in place.  In 1991, 2500 clerics had their positions 
taken away.  Mosque building had blossomed during the period of relative religious 
freedom in the 1980s.  Now the state closed fifty mosques in Xinjiang and stopped 
construction plans for a hundred more.48  The state then enacted legislation that forbade 
students and Party officials from believing in God.  Gardner Bovingdon quotes a XUAR 
Party Committee note on this.   
Ordinary citizens are permitted two freedoms (this refers to the freedom to 
believe or not believe).  Though Party members are also citizens, they are 
first of all members of the party of the proletariat and therefore enjoy only 
one freedom — the freedom not to believe — and absolutely do not enjoy 
the freedom to believe.  They cannot have feet in two boats.49   
                                                 
47 Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang,” in 
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This new position carried over into other policies as well such as the “education in 
atheism” campaign.   
In order to increase the availability of hard power at the disposal of local officials, 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was strengthened.  The Corps was 
originally commissioned in 1954 in order to promote social unity, advance economic 
growth, and protect Chinese interests in Xinjiang.  It consisted mostly of party-loyal 
soldier-farmers who were given economic incentive to relocate to the region with the 
expectation that they could be called upon in times of crisis to quell social disturbances 
and provide regional security.  It was also and still remains the primary mechanism used 
by the state to carry out Han migration to Xinjiang.  The Corps has morphed through the 
decades into a de facto arm of the local police, and in the early 1990s it added resisting 
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement to its credo.   
Han migration to Xinjiang in the 1990s increased significantly due to the 
opportunities created by the shift in policy by the state run economy.  The need for 
manufacturing of all sorts, combined with Xinjiang’s endowment of natural resources and 
government incentives to develop its western territories, produced an almost 
unprecedented population migration to the area.  The result is that between 1990 and 
2000, the Han population in Xinjiang has increased by 2.7 million people.50  It is 
significant to note, however, that all of the minority populations in Xinjiang increased by 
roughly the same percentage during this time.  As a result, though there is still no 
majority ethnic population in Xinjiang, Uyghurs concerns about Han receiving 
preferential treatment are still validated.  
D.  THE NEW HARD POWER 
The element of hard power that has put teeth into Chinese policy in Xinjiang has 
been the increasing use of “strike hard” campaigns since the 1990s.  The campaigns are 
designed to quiet social disturbance or target particular crimes thereby enforcing the rule 
of law.  The technique has been employed throughout China for this purpose, but in 
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Xinjiang the primary focus of the last decade has been to quell separatist movements.  In 
the post-9/11 era, the campaigns have evolved into smaller scale, lower intensity 
campaigns with a more narrow focus where secret trials and summary executions are 
common.  According to Human Rights Watch,  
After September 11, 2001, China used the ‘war on terrorism’ to justify its 
policies, making no distinction between the handful of separatists who 
condone violence and those who desire genuine autonomy or a separate 
state. In fact, the authorities treat cultural expressions of identity as 
equivalent to violent agitation. In February 2005, Uighur writer Nurmemet 
Yasin was sentenced to a ten-year prison term for publishing ‘The Wild 
Pigeon,’ an alleged separatist tract. Korash Huseyin, editor of the journal 
that published the story, is serving a three-year term.51   
Fredrick Starr, speaking in 2005, said that the government has continued to use 
strike hard campaigns even though they wiped out any separatist organs in Xinjiang a 
decade ago.52   
 Mathew Moneyhon has tackled the question of state policy and its implications 
for Uyghurs separatist prospects from the legal and financial perspective.  He notes that 
many Uyghurs see themselves better off now than they were twenty or thirty years ago 
and so there is economic incentive to work within the established framework.  This is 
especially true when one considers the situation of many poor people in the states that 
border Xinjiang.  They do not have the backing of the roaring Chinese economy to 
improve their living conditions.  Even so, the reforms of this period do not address the 
fundamental questions of equality with the Han or the role of the state in the local 
economy.  Ultimately he concludes that asymmetric economic growth will surely spurn 
more Uyghurs resistance to the state.  However, if enough economic benefits “trickle 
down” then the Uyghurs are more likely to continue to be satisfied with the status quo.53   
Moneyhon’s excellent analysis does not tell the whole story of the prospects for a 
separatist movement gaining real popular support in Xinjiang.  More importantly, legal 
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and financial analysis does not offer any explanation as to what role religion will play in 
this matter and more specifically why don’t radical Islamic elements which fully back 
separatist movements have popular support?  In fairness, Moneyhon was not trying to 
answer these questions.  However if history has taught us anything about Islamic 
fundamentalism, it is that popular support for a fundamentalist movement does not 
necessarily follow from rational calculations about legal and financial matters.   
E. MODERN IDENTITY 
The real question that must be addressed is who are the Uyghurs?  Historical 
claims that are accepted today in modern Uyghurs history do not necessarily match the 
historical record.  Due to the geography of Xinjiang, many different Turkish speaking 
Muslims populations proliferated.  This was because travel between the oases were they 
lived was difficult.  Dru Gladney argues that it may even be inappropriate to use the term 
Uyghurs to describe Muslims in modern day Xinjiang.  He points out that the label 
“Uyghur” was used by the Chinese to describe many different Turkish speaking Muslim 
minorities in Xinjiang.  The label stuck.54  Others argue that the notion of a united 
Uyghurs history was created in the modern day as a rallying point for promoting 
nationalism.  It is an important point to consider in trying to understand why there is only 
small, isolated pockets of Islamic fundamentalism in Xinjiang and the general population 
does not support it.   
There are many answers to that question, of course, but in order to understand 
why there is not popular support for fundamentalism in Xinjiang, one must ascertain 
which is stronger: Uyghurs nationalism or Uyghurs Islamic identity.  Some have argued 
that nationalism in Xinjiang is defined against what the Chinese have tried to create there 
or that nationalism is solely a product of historical experience.  In the same way, it has 
been argued that Uyghurs Islamic identity was produced as a byproduct of repressive 
Chinese policies or that the history of Islam in the region has produced who the Uyghurs 
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are today.  These two sources of identity cannot be separated in this way.  Both of these 
identities, among others, are present in every Muslim in Xinjiang.   
Most scholars agree that under the current circumstances in Xinjiang, it seems 
unlikely that a separatist movement will gain sufficient momentum to become a political 
reality.  From that perspective, it could be said that despite all its problems and 
contradictions, Beijing’s policy has been successful.  If the metric of success is whether 
Xinjiang remains part of the PRC, then it certainly has been a success.  But why? 
There has been a great deal of work in social movement theory to explain why 
Muslims rebel.  Mohammed Hafez’s argument seems to fit the Uyghurs quite well at first 
blush.  He challenges the popular notions that rebellion occurs due to “economic 
deprivation, psychological alienation produced by severe impoverishment, or failed 
modernization.”55  He draws several conclusions that appear applicable:  
(1). If Islamists are provided access to the political system in early state-
movement interactions, they will accommodate the state regime.  If they 
are denied this access, however, they will opt for more radical strategies.  
(2). If state repression is preemptive, rebellion is less likely to occur.  If 
state repression is reactive, Islamists are more likely to resort to violence.  
(3). If state repression is selective, for example targeting only the top 
echelons of resistance movements, rebellion is less likely to occur.  If 
repression is indiscriminate, it will likely lead to more violence.56 
After the first blush, however, the explanation is no longer adequate to explain the 
events in Xinjiang.  When the CCP came to power in China, the Uyghurs were granted 
access to local government, but not in a meaningful way.  The system of governance 
provided for a parallel structure of local administrators and party officials where it was 
clear that the party members held the real power.  Twice prior to this time in the twentieth 
century the Uyghurs had achieved self-determination with the short lived creation of the 
East Turkistan Republic.  With autonomy in their recent history, party rule did not take 
root.   
Further, the Uyghurs are sitting on a gold mine of mineral resources that are being 
exploited by the PRC.  Even so, and considering that the PRC has invested heavily in 
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Xinjiang, most Uyghurs are still poor and less educated than their Han contemporaries.  It 
is not entirely clear why this is so.  It may be a deep seated prejudice on the part of the 
Han toward the Uyghurs or it may be that the way the PRC has invested in Xinjiang has 
produced this situation.  Modernization in Xinjiang has failed the Uyghurs.  Affirmative 
action policies that do not apply to private industry have only served to widen the 
economic gap between the Uyghurs and the Han since private industry is where the 
resources and technology are being invested.  In short, as China modernizes, the Uyghurs 
are being left further behind.   
According to Hafez, the Uyghurs should be in a state of rebellion or it should be 
very likely for it to occur.  Yet it has not and most experts agree that it seems unlikely in 
the future.   
F. CONCLUSIONS 
 The period from 1978 to the present has been a period of great change in China.  
Nowhere is this more true than in Xinjiang.  The era has replaced the ideological 
underpinnings of Chinese policy of the past with pragmatism.  In Xinjiang, this has meant 
the exploitation of natural resources to fuel the economy.  Now more than ever, it is vital 
for the Chinese to maintain peace in Xinjiang.   
 The period of tolerance during the 1980s as a result of reforms by Deng Xiaoping 
created a new security environment in Xinjiang by the time Tiananmen Square, the Baron 
riot, and the collapse of the Soviet Union had occurred at the end of the decade.  The 
government was no longer able to simply crack down on dissent.  Instead, new policies 
were needed to achieve Chinese interests in Xinjiang.  The government adopted a new 
four-fold strategy designed to tighten the bonds between Xinjiang and the PRC.  The 
influence of the new states that were created on Xinjiang’s border after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union would be minimized.  Infrastructure and communication links between 
Xinjiang and its neighbors would be strengthened.  Law enforcement presence in the 
region would be increased to quell unrest as soon as it appeared.  Finally, incentives to 
increase Han migration to the area would be maximized. 
 Most significantly, Han migration increased and the strike hard campaigns took 
on a new purpose.  Han migration had always been the primary method by which Beijing 
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hoped to assimilate Xinjiang into the PRC.  However economic opportunity in Xinjiang 
during the 1990s produced unprecedented migration to the area through the development 
of natural resources.  It is interesting to note that even though migration hit an all time 
high during this period, the Han are still not a majority in Xinjiang.   
 The War on Terror has turned Muslim separatist movements into fundamentalist 
movements in the view of the Chinese government.  Perhaps it simply co-opted the idea 
for its own interests.  Either way, the strike hard campaigns that had been historically 
used to target specific crimes or quiet unrest now became a tightly focused, low-intensity 
method for routing out “Muslim extremists.”   
 Uyghur national identity has been created through centuries of struggle with the 
hardships of life in Xinjiang and the Chinese government.  In modern times, government 
economic and social policy has produced a disadvantaged Uyghur population.  They seek 
independence yet seem unlikely to achieve it.  Their religion is incompatible with their 
government and yet the status quo seems to be the most likely course of action for the 
future.   
 Nationalism is strong among the Uyghurs.  Their historians have written a history 
that is rich in heroism and distinctly not Chinese.  Their ideas about what it means to be 
Uyghur are clearly their own.  At the same time, their religion is also unique to them.  
Centuries of Buddhist, Confucian, and even Christian influence have produced a unique 
brand of Sufi Islam.  Within each person in Xinjiang is a melting pot of identity that 
contains history, nationalism, religion, hopes, wants, and needs.  Which is the strongest at 
any given time determines how a person will act.   
 For the Uyghurs, national identity is stronger than Islamic identity.  They live in a 
secular state that controls how they practice their religion, manage family planning, and 
prosecute any religious element that appears to threaten national security.  Even so, they 
have not taken to fundamentalist Islam or even support it in general.  The way that they 
identity themselves is less about Islam and more about the past and future independent 
Uyghur state.  Their Islamic identity is less important, relatively speaking, than their 
sense of nationalism.   
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V. MODERN CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
There are fifty-five ethnic minority groups in China today with a total population 
of about ninety-one million people.  Of that small percentage of the population, about 
twenty million are Muslim Uyghurs that live in the Xinjiang province and constitute one 
of China’s largest Muslim populations.  The Uyghurs, like many minority populations in 
this part of the world, have a history of violence that dates back to well before Xinjiang 
was part of China.  Significantly, in their struggle against the Chinese government over 
the issue of autonomy and human rights, they have not radicalized.  Islamic 
fundamentalism has not taken root in Xinjiang and there is little evidence that the 
population as a whole support the efforts of the few radical elements that do exist even 
though they share a common goal of autonomy.   
The framework for understanding why this is true is a comparison of the relative 
strength of Uyghur nationalism and Islamic identity.  Uyghur nationalism that has been 
shaped by a millennium of history wrought with internal conflict, self-determination, 
outside influence, war, and peace, among many other things.  Similarly, Uyghur Islamic 
identity has been shaped by the Shamanic religion it replaced, influence from other 
Muslim and secular nations, and ritual and tradition of other religions in the area.  In this 
way, the Uyghurs experience is not unique in Central Asia.  However, the process has 
created a unique balance of nationalism and Islamic identity within each Uyghur person.  
 The Uyghurs are a mostly hard working, Islamic people that have dealt with harsh 
oppression, and political and religious censure for most of their history.  There is also a 
history of attacks, invasions, demonstrations, and revolts that continue to the present day.  
Throughout its history, Xinjiang has never been peaceful for long.  Yet through it all the 
Uyghurs have endured.  They are a product of their past and their belief system like any 
other population.  Every aspect of their identity has been shaped and changed by a long 
list of outside powers that have tried to subdue, co-opt or assimilate them.  Yet the 
Uyghurs have not been subdued for long or assimilated in any meaningful way. The 
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effects of Chinese policies during this era on Uyghurs economics, culture, and population 
have been well documented.  What has not been closely examined, however, is the effect 
these policies had and continue to have on Uyghurs nationalism and Islamic identity.  
 It is important to understand how the Uyghurs identify themselves because a 
person will identify himself differently based on the context in which he is asked to do 
so.  Ultimately for the Uyghurs, their sense of nationalism is stronger, relatively 
speaking, than their Islamic identity.  For this reason, Islamic fundamentalism has not 
taken root in Xinjiang.   
The period from 1949 to the present has seen the formation of modern Uyghur 
identity.  PRC policy toward the Uyghurs is different from their predecessors in that the 
modern Chinese state has sought to assimilate Uyghur society into a nominal “Chinese” 
society instead of co-opting them or utilizing proxy rule.  The challenge of integrating 
domestic and foreign policy in way that serves the interests of the state and the interests 
of the Uyghurs is as great a challenge today as it has ever been.  In the post 9/11 security 
environment, the need for the PRC to balance its international position on the War on 
Terror with its economic realities and Uyghur domestic concerns have only complicated 
the matter further.   
Prior to Mao’s death, the primary means of assimilating Uyghur culture was 
through the use of forced Han migration to Xinjiang and intolerance of religious and 
social differences.  Though it can certainly be argued that Mao’s policies were successful 
because Xinjiang remained and remains part of the PRC, it would not be true to say that 
the Uyghur were assimilated into “Chinese” culture.  Their long and proud history 
culminated in a sense of nationalism that could not be stamped out by new Han neighbors 
or PRC troops.  Even the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Cultural Revolution, which 
reduced Islamic practice to state regulated activity and even drove it into quiet ceremony 
within the sanctity of the home in many cases was not enough for Uyghurs to diminish 
their sense of who they are.    
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms again changed the calculus between 
Beijing and the Uyghurs.  In place of the brutal intolerance to cultural differences, there 
was a return to pragmatism and a relaxing of restrictions on religious practice.  These 
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changes were welcomed by most in Xinjiang and these reforms probably allowed the 
most religious and political freedom to date.  Even so, as the Chinese economy came to 
life and took off, economic opportunity for the Uyghur was not forthcoming.  Decades of 
discrimination against the Ugyhurs by their fellow Han countrymen produced a less 
educated Uyghur population with less access to resources and opportunity in the modern 
era.  Uyghur sentiments against these practices have been harnessed by politicians in 
order to agitate for separatism.   The idea of returning Xinjiang to an independent Uyghur 
Islamic state has enormous popular appeal and political traction.  It is not Islam, however, 
that gives the idea its appeal.  Rather it is the Uyghurs sense of who they are.  
The element of hard power that has put teeth into Chinese policy in Xinjiang in 
the modern era has been the increasing use of “strike hard” campaigns since the 1990s.  
The technique has been employed throughout China for this purpose quieting social 
unrest, but in Xinjiang the focus of the last decade has been to quell separatist 
movements.  In the post-9/11 era, the campaigns have evolved into smaller scale, lower 
intensity campaigns with a more narrow focus where secret trials and summary 
executions are common.  The reality of the post-9/11 world is that Islamic separatist 
movements are now seen as terrorist movements in many cases.   This is especially true 
in China were such a position often serves the interests of the state.       
 Much has been written about the rise of Chinese nationalism since the end of the 
Cold War.  The PRC has made it a surrogate for Cold War idealism in order to hold the 
country together.  The argument follows that it is the rise of Han Chinese nationalism that 
has driven the Uyghurs to separatism.57  This argument misses the long view of Uyghur 
nationalism in the context of 1,200 years of mostly oppressive rule and the political 
realities of the modern era.   
 Modern Uyghur identity reflects their rich history.  It has been created through 
centuries of struggle with the hardships of life in Xinjiang and the Chinese government.  
In modern times, government economic and social policy has produced a disadvantaged 
Uyghur population.  They seek independence yet seem unlikely to achieve it.  Their 
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religion is incompatible with their government and yet the status quo seems to be the 
most likely course of action for the future.   
 Nationalism is strong among the Uyghurs.  Their ideas about what it means to be 
Uyghur are clearly their own.  They have not embraced Islamic fundamentalism because 
their identity as Uyghurs is stronger than their Islamic identity.   
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